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We formulate a two-country model with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms to reconsider
labor market linkages in open economies. Labor-market imperfections arise by virtue of country-specific
real minimum wages. Two principal experiments are considered. First, we show that trade liberalization
under minimum wages differs significantly from trade liberalization under standard assumptions. In
the former case, there is effectively a perfectly elastic supply of labor to production whereas in the
conventional case it is assumed that aggregate labor supply is perfectly inelastic. Standard effects on
marginal and average firm productivity are reversed in our model, yet there are significant gains from
trade arising from employment expansion, an effect quite different from the source of gains from trade
in the conventional approach.  Second, we show that with firm heterogeneity an increase in one country's
minimum wage triggers firm exit in both countries and thus harms workers at home and abroad. In
an extension to our baseline model, we illustrate that offshoring production from the high-wage to
the low-wage country within multinational firms lowers the scope for exporting the costs of a higher













In an open economy, the consequences of labor market institutions are not conned to domestic
workers but also spill over to foreign ones. This suggests a correlation in labor market outcome
across countries due to institutional factors quite distinct from the dynamic transmission of
shocks studied by macroeconomists. Figure 1 illustrates the respective correlation in unemploy-
ment rates of two major economic blocs, the European Union (EU; with 15 member countries
as of 1995) and the United States for the time span 1984-2004. Two features of the relationship
in the gure are notable. First, while the unemployment rate of the US is considerably lower
than the respective rate in the EU, unemployment is clearly an issue on both sides of the At-
lantic (see Nickell, 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Second, the relationship between the two
unemployment rates is positive.1 Clearly, the unconditional correlation of unemployment rates
does not reect a causal relationship. However, there is evidence that labor market outcome in
general and unemployment rates in specic are positively correlated across regions of various
levels of aggregation (see S udekum, 2005; Patacchini and Zenou, 2007).
Academic interest in the consequences of labor market institutions in open economies has
been sparked by the seminal work of Brecher (1974). Yet, an intuition for the positive re-
lationship of unemployment rates in Figure 1 is not available from that or subsequent work.
Developing a model to ll this gap is the aim of our paper. For this purpose, we deviate from
two standard assumptions in the existing literature on international labor market linkages. On
the one hand, we assume that labor market imperfections are not conned to one industrialized
country or a subset of such countries but they are ubiquitous among industrialized economies.
Clearly, institutions and, hence, the degree of labor market imperfections may dier across
countries and so may the rates of involuntary unemployment. On the other hand, we consider
heterogeneous rms that supply dierentiated products. While it is uncontroversial that mod-
els of heterogeneous rms can improve our understanding about international trade patterns,
1Notice that the relationship would be similar when including observations prior to 1984 and after 2004.
However, we do not display a longer time series since the denition of European unemployment rates has changed
between 1983 and 1984. Also, we do not consider more recent data since EU unemployment rates may have
changed structurally in the aftermath of EU's Eastern Enlargement in 2004. Beyond that it is possible to assess
the correlation in unemployment rates by considering dyadic correlations over a certain time span and comparing
the number of positive and negative correlation coecients. For instance one can do so for the following 25 OECD
countries (all OECD members except of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Turkey) between
1992 and 2004. This is the country sample and time span for which unemployment rates have full coverage in the
World Bank's World Development Indicators 2007. The lower triangular of the symmetric matrix of correlation
coecients has 300 entries. Of those, 94 are negative while 206 are positive. Hence, the issue we address is
relevant not only at the level of country blocs but also across dyads.
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Unemployment rate of EU15
Figure 1: Unemployment rates of the US and the EU15 (1984-2004)
there is only a handful of studies that addresses the interaction of rm heterogeneity and labor
market imperfections in the process of globalization, none of them focussing on international
spillover eects in the case of asymmetric institutional settings.2 As we show in this paper, rm
heterogeneity is elemental for a positive correlation of unemployment rates across countries in
response to a change in labor market tightness in just one economy. The reason for the latter is
that the composition of producers changes which counteracts the cross-border spillover eects
of imperfect labor markets in models with homogeneous rms.
To substantiate the role of rm heterogeneity for international labor market linkages, it is
worth looking at the pioneering work of Davis (1998) who was the rst one to address cross-
border spillovers between European and US labor markets. Relying on a 2  2 Heckscher-
Ohlin-type model with minimum wages in Europe and a perfect labor market in the US, Davis
concluded that European unemployment props up US wages. This result is immediately intuitive
with international factor price equalization (i.e., with diversication of production and in the
absence of trade impediments), and it remarkably qualies the widely accepted view that rising
2Recent contributions that look at the interaction of rm heterogeneity and labor market institutions in the
process of globalization include Davis and Harrigan (2007); Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008); Helpman,
Itskhoki, and Redding (2008); Egger and Kreickemeier (2009).
3European unemployment and rising US wage inequality are \two sides of the same coin" (Krug-
man, 1994, p. 31). As pointed out by Davis (1998), the latter conclusion would only be valid if
Europe and the US were isolated from each other but not if they are linked through international
trade ows. With factor price equalization due to trade linkages, a binding European minimum
wage raises unskilled wages in the US and thus reduces wage inequality there.3 As noted by
Davis, this nding is robust to considering homogeneous, imperfectly competitive rms under
monopolistic competition (rather than perfectly competitive ones) and, hence, the assumption
of perfect competition in a traditional trade model is not responsible for this outcome. Rather,
it will be illustrated below that rm homogeneity and, hence, the exclusion of adjustments in the
composition of producers is crucial for positive cross-border spillovers of national labor market
tightness.
To conduct our analysis, we set up a model in which rms produce and supply dierentiated
intermediate goods under monopolistic competition as in Ethier (1982) and Markusen (1989).
Intermediate goods production uses labor as the only input and intermediates are aggregated
into a homogeneous output good. As is well known from these models, opening up an economy
provides access to a larger pool of intermediate varieties and, hence, creates gains from trade
through a positive external scale eect (that can be associated with amplied division of labor).
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that producers in the dierentiated goods industry are het-
erogeneous with respect to their productivity. As compared to a framework with homogeneous
rms, the assumption of heterogeneous producers opens an additional channel through which
countries can benet from trade liberalization: changes in the composition of producers due to
exit of the least productive competitors and self-selection of productive rms into export status.
While either eect is crucial for the welfare implications of trade liberalization, it is the
adjustment at the extensive margin of rms (i.e., exit from/entry into the market as such)
that is essential for our analysis. It is thus convenient to focus on compositional eects at the
extensive margin, while disregarding selection into export status by setting trade costs equal
to zero. Furthermore, we restrict our attention to trade between two economies, which are
identical in all respects except of their labor market institutions. Labor market institutions are
introduced by means of a real minimum wage which may dier between the two economies. If
the real minimum wage, i.e., the nominal wage divided by the consumer price index, is binding,
production faces a perfectly elastic labor supply as opposed to perfectly inelastic labor supply
in the Ethier as well as the Melitz model. Clearly, with a binding real minimum wage, there
exists a third channel through countries can benet from trade liberalization: an increase in the
3See Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006); Meckl (2006) for extensions and modications of Davis' framework which
suggest the same conclusion as Davis (1998) with regard to linkages of foreign and domestic labor markets in
open economies: more rigid labor markets abroad benet domestic labor.
4employment rate. As pointed out in our analysis, this employment eect is closely related to
and interacts with the other two sources of gains from trade.
Regarding the existence of cross-country spillovers of national labor market institutions, it
is notable that international trade links the variable production costs of intermediate goods
producers at home and abroad. With homogeneous producers (under diversied production and
free trade), the minimum wage can only be binding in one country while full employment prevails
in the other one. The reason is that if one of the two economies (say Europe) faces a higher
minimum wage than the other economy (say, the US), intermediate goods producers in Europe
are forced to exit, while at the same time new intermediate goods producers enter in the US.
Intuitively, production shifts to the country that oers lower production costs. This adjustment
process continues until all workers in the US are employed and US wages are driven up to the
European minimum wage. As in Davis (1998), an increase in the binding real minimum wage
therefore raises unemployment in Europe and props up wages in the US if rms are homogeneous.
However, if rms dier in their production costs due to heterogeneity in productivity, trade
only equalizes the variable production costs of the marginal (i.e., the least productive) producers
in the two economies. In this case, minimum wages can dier and still be binding in both
countries as long as productivity dierences of marginal rms compensate for the prevailing
wage dierences. As a consequence, country-specic minimum wages may lead to involuntary
unemployment in both economies if rms dier in their productivity levels. Notably, if Europe
raises its minimum wage, US workers need not benet from it. The reason is that there are
two counteracting eects. On the one hand, a higher minimum wage induces an eciency loss
and hence reduces aggregate world demand for intermediate goods. This hurts both economies
and hence forces rms to exit in Europe and the US ceteris paribus. On the other hand,
there is relocation of production of intermediate goods from Europe to the US in response to a
relative rise of the European minimum wage. While both of these eects also exist in a model
with homogeneous rms, the second eect is dampened with heterogeneous producers due to
a decline of the marginal US rm's productivity (triggered by entry of new rms with low
productivity) and an increase of the marginal European rm's productivity (triggered by exit
of the least productive incumbent rms). As a consequence, the second (production relocation)
eect does not necessarily compensate the rst (aggregate demand) eect so that a higher
European minimum wage may lower labor demand in Europe as well as the US. This indicates
that negative spillover eects of an increase in labor market imperfections are possible in open
economies if rms dier in their productivity levels and, hence, provides an intuition for the
positive correlation between unemployment rates in Europe and the US as depicted in Figure 1.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the basic model
5structure and investigate the autarky equilibrium. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium
of the open economy and compare the respective outcome with the autarky scenario. Section
4 provides a comparative static analysis to study the impact that an increase in the European
minimum wage exhibits on employment and aggregate wage income in Europe and the US. In
Section 5 we allow for international oshoring within multinational rms, in order to see whether
and to what extent the insights from our analysis depend on the mode of rm organization.4
The last section concludes with a brief summary of the most important results.
2 The closed economy
2.1 Basic model assumptions
We consider a model with one homogeneous nal good { used for consumption as well as in-
vestment { and a mass of dierentiated intermediate goods. The economy under consideration
is populated by L workers, each supplying one unit of labor. The production technology in the













where q(v) is the quantity of intermediate variant v employed in the production of Y , V is the
set of available varieties with measure M, and  denotes the elasticity of substitution between
variants of the intermediate. Parameter  2 [0;1] is inversely related to the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz variety eect, which we will refer to as the \external scale eect", following Ethier
(1982). In the borderline case of  = 1, the variety or external-scale eect vanishes, and Y has
constant-returns to scale in both the levels and the number of varieties. In the case of  = 0, we
have the standard Dixit-Stiglitz case, where Y exhibits increasing returns and is homogeneous





















As will be discussed in detail in Subsection 2.3, a necessary (but not sucient) condition for
Walrasian stability of the equilibrium in the presence of minimum wages is that  > 0.
4In this respect, our paper contributes to a well-established literature that addresses the role of labor market
imperfections (typically associated with labor unions) for explaining the foreign investment decision of interna-
tional producers (see, e.g., Skaksen and Srensen, 2001; Lommerud, Meland, and Srgard, 2003; Eckel and Egger,
2009). However, none of these studies looks at cross-border linkages in unemployment rates, which are at the
heart of this paper's interest.
6Let us use P to denote the price of the homogeneous nal good and p(v) to denote the price
of intermediate variant v. Final goods producers choose q(v) (for all v) in order to maximize
their prots, PY  
R
v2V p(v)q(v)dv. Under perfect competition, the price of each intermediate
good equals this good's marginal revenue product and prots of nal goods producers are driven
down to zero due to free market entry. Consequently, P must fulll the zero prot condition
PY =
R





1=(1 ). Choosing nal output as the num eraire and setting its price
equal to unity, we can formulate the solution to the prot maximization problem of nal goods




with the latter characterizing demand for intermediate good variety v.
Intermediate goods are supplied by monopolistically competitive rms, with each rm pro-
ducing a unique variety (and thus M being equal to the mass of competitors). Output of
an intermediate goods producer depends on labor input l and labor productivity : q = l.
Marginal production costs are given by w= with w denoting a (real) minimum wage that is
identical across rms and set by the government. Facing demand (2) and taking aggregate
variables as given, intermediate goods producers maximize their prots by setting prices as a





and concludes our brief discussion on prot maximization of intermediate goods producers, when
taking their entry decision as given.
2.2 Firm entry and aggregation
Regarding rm entry, we apply a modied version of the Melitz (2003) framework and assume
that the mass of potential entrants is exogenously given by parameter N. These potential
entrants dier in their productivity levels , with G() denoting the cumulative distribution of
productivity. Hence, entry reduces to a one-stage process and we obtain a static model with
aggregate prots being strictly positive (see Do and Levchenko, 2009). In all other respects, the
properties of the goods market variables in the static model variant are the same as those of the
dynamic version in Melitz (2003).
In particular, for given aggregate variables, productivity of the marginal active rm { which
exhibits the lowest productivity level that is consistent with non-negative prots { is determined
7by a zero cuto prot condition. Assuming that the operation of an input rm requires the initial
investment of one unit of nal output, the respective condition reads5
r() =  (4)
where  denotes the productivity level of the marginal rm (in short, marginal productivity)
and r() = (Y=M)p()1  denotes revenues of this rm. Hence, the mass of active rms is
determined as M = N(1 G()). In order to obtain aggregate variables, we can characterize an
average rm by the following condition: P = M(1 )=(1 )p(~ ). As discussed in Melitz (2003),
the productivity level of the average rm (average productivity, in short), ~ , equals the weighted
harmonic mean of the productivity levels of active producers, with relative outputs q()=q(~ )
serving as weights. The usefulness of this productivity average ows from the observation that
aggregate revenues, R, and aggregate prots, , are the same in our model as they would be if
the economy were populated by M rms with identical productivity level ~ : R = Mr(~ ) and
 = M(~ ), with (~ ) = r(~ )=   1. Final output is given by Y = M( )=( 1)q(~ ), implying
that Y = M1 1=q(~ ), if  = 0, while Y = Mq(~ ), if  = 1.
To facilitate our analysis, we impose the by now standard assumption of Pareto-distributed
productivity levels and consider G() = 1    k, where k is the shape parameter of the Pareto
distribution and the lower bound to productivity levels is normalized to unity (i.e.,   1).
The corresponding density function is given by g() = k k 1.6 Under the Pareto assumption,








where k >    1 is assumed in order to ensure that the productivity average has a nite
positive value (see Baldwin, 2005). Furthermore, revenues of the average rm are proportional








k    + 1
: (6)
2.3 Equilibrium in the closed economy
In order to characterize the autarky equilibrium, let us rst concentrate on productivity lev-
els , ~ , and the mass of rms M. Equilibrium values of these variables are determined by
5Notably, assuming that xed costs are equal to unity is not essential for the results of interest here. It simply
helps economizing on notation.
6Besides its attractiveness in terms of analytical tractability, the Pareto assumption entertains considerable
empirical support. For instance, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2006, p. 17) conclude from a rm-level analysis
in European industries that \Pareto is a fairly good approximation of the underlying productivity distributions."
8the following three equations. The rst one is the cuto productivity condition (CPC), which
determines a relationship between the mass of competitors M and cuto (or marginal) produc-
tivity : M = N(1   G()) = N() k. The second one is the average productivity condition
(APC), which links marginal and average productivity, according to (5). The third one can
be deduced from prot-maximizing behavior of rms and characterizes those combinations of
marginal productivity  and the mass of competitors M that are consistent with this behavior.
This prot maximization condition (PMC) can be determined by linking r(~ ) = (Y=M)p(~ )1 











Figure 2 illustrates the three conditions and the equilibrium values of , ~ , and M graph-
ically. (We use subscript a to refer to autarky, there.) For drawing the two loci in the right
panel of this gure, we have imposed two additional assumptions. First, we assume that N is
suciently large in order to ensure an intersection of the two downward sloping curves at  > 1
in the left panel of Figure 2. Otherwise, the equilibrium would be characterized by M = N
and  = 1, and hence all potential producers would be active, irrespective of their productivity
levels. We exclude this case in order to make our results comparable to those in Melitz (2003),
who considers an unbounded mass of potential entrants. Second, (Walrasian) stability of the
equilibrium requires k(1   ) < (   1). This ensures that the CPC locus intersects the PMC
locus from above. The respective condition is fullled if the external scale eect is not too large,
i.e.,  is suciently close to unity. For an intuition about the latter, note that a bigger mass of
competitors exhibits two eects on rm entry. On the one hand, it raises nal goods output,
thereby increasing demand for intermediate goods and thus rendering rm entry more attractive.
This provides a source of instability, as a larger number of rms stimulates subsequent entry.
Notably, this (aggregate demand) eect is the stronger, the larger the external scale eect. On
the other hand, a bigger M implies more competition among intermediate goods producers for a
given level of nal goods output and, hence, a negative impact on demand for each variety. The
latter stabilizes the equilibrium in the sense that an increase in the mass of competitors lowers
the incentive for further rm entry. From eq. (2) we can deduce that the latter eect is relatively
strong if the external scale eect is weak, and it dominates the positive aggregate demand eect
if  > (k  +1)=k.7 Summing up, if the mass of potential entrants is suciently large and the
external scale eect is not too strong, then a unique and stable autarky equilibrium exists. In
7Two remarks are in order here. First, it is clear that either of these eects materializes in any monopolistic
competition model. However, in other models there exists an additional stabilizing force by means of increasing
factor prices in response to rm entry. This adjustment channel has been closed in our model by considering a
binding real minimum wage which constrains the parameter domain supporting a stable equilibrium. Second, the
9the borderline case of no external scale eects, i.e., at  = 1, the PMC locus becomes horizontal



















Figure 2: Equilibrium in the closed economy
A higher minimum wage, w, renders production of rms with low productivity levels unattrac-
tive and thus raises marginal productivity  and, by virtue of (5), also average productivity
~ . At the same time, the mass of active rms declines because of the negative link between 
and M that follows from CPC. Graphically, an increase in the minimum wage shifts the PMC
locus outwards, with the respective productivity and rm number eects following from Figure
2. A larger pool of potential entrants, N, shifts the CPC locus outwards with a positive eect
on the mass of active rms M. If there are external scale eects, i.e.,  < 1, the higher mass of
active rms induces higher demand for all intermediate goods. As a consequence, market entry
minimum level of  that supports existence of a stable equilibrium increases in k. The reason is that a higher k
lowers the elasticity of marginal productivity 
 with respect to M (in absolute terms). A given increase in M
leads to a smaller reduction of 
 (and, hence, ~ ) at higher k, thereby aggravating the positive aggregate demand
eect of a greater mass of M as described above. The latter amplies the destabilizing forces in the model ceteris
paribus and, hence, requires  to increase in order to support a stable equilibrium at higher k.
8It is notable that, in contrast to Melitz (2003), we did not make use of the zero cuto prot condition in (4)
and (6) for characterizing the equilibrium in Figure 2. However, this condition will play a role for determining
equilibrium output and employment in autarky (see below).
10now becomes attractive for rms with relatively low productivity levels, implying that  and
~  decline. In the borderline case of  = 1, the increase in M does not stimulate demand for
intermediate goods so that  and ~  remain unaected by the increase in the mass of potential
entrants, N.
To facilitate a comparison between autarky and the trade equilibrium in the next section, it









































Total output of nal goods can now be determined by combining the adding-up condition Y =











k    + 1
(11)
and completes our discussion of the goods market equilibrium in autarky.
For characterizing the labor market outcome, note that the constant markup-pricing rule
establishes a proportional relationship between revenues p()q() and labor cost expenditures
wl()=(   1) at the rm level: p()q() = wl()=(   1). Furthermore, let us denote
the unemployment rate by u and employment of the average rm by l(~ ). Then, due to the
adding-up condition, employment in all rms, Ml(~ ), must equal the total employed labor force,
(1 u)L. Accordingly, total labor cost expenditures (which are equal to aggregate labor income,
W) are proportional to total revenues, i.e., W = Mr(~ )[(   1)=], with Mr(~ ) = Y and








k    + 1
kN1 
 k
k(1 ) +1 k(   1)
k    + 1
(12)
and






k    + 1
kN1 
 k
k(1 ) +1 k(   1)
Lw[k    + 1]
(13)
11respectively, according to (11).
For the minimum wage to be binding, i.e., for ua > 0, the pool of workers L needs to be
suciently large. This is assumed from now on. A higher L raises unemployment u and leaves
aggregate wage income W unaected. With constant markup pricing, aggregate wage income is
proportional to total output of nal goods, which has been shown to be independent of L. With a
binding minimum wage, an increase in L reduces employment rate (1 u) proportionally, thereby
leaving aggregate employment unchanged. However, from this result it should not be deduced
that the unemployment rate exhibits a country-size pattern. To the extent that larger economies
also have a larger pool of potential entrants, N, the model is consistent with the empirical
observation that unemployment may be a problem of large as well as small economies. Beyond
that, a higher minimum wage lowers total labor income W and worsens the unemployment
problem, if k(1   ) <    1. This is intuitive, as a higher minimum wage reinforces the labor
market imperfection and therefore renders the market outcome less ecient. This completes our
discussion of the autarky equilibrium.
3 The open economy
We now assume that there are two countries whose economies are of the type described in the
previous section. The two countries are fully identical except for the size of minimum wages.
The minimum wage is binding in both economies and we associate the country with the higher
minimum wage with Europe (superscript E) and the other one with the US (superscript A) in
order to capture the empirical fact that labor market imperfections are more severe in Europe
than in the US. Workers are immobile and rms can serve the foreign market only through
exports, while the consequences of oshoring of production within vertical multinational rms
are discussed in an extension to our model (see Section 5). Furthermore, to facilitate our analysis,
we abstract from any trade impediments (for nal goods as well as intermediates) and assume
that all intermediate goods producers are exporters.9 Accordingly, Y and P are identical for
all rms, irrespective of the country in which they produce and, hence, the zero cuto prot
conditions, which are given by rE(
E) =  and rA(









9It is an empirical stylized fact that there is self-selection into export status and that exporters exhibit higher
levels of productivity than non-exporters (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999). However, accounting for
exporting as well as non-exporting rms in the model would only complicate our analysis without changing the
main insights.
12which is strictly larger than unity, if wE > wA. Eqs.(3) and (14) imply pE(
E) = pA(
A) as
well as pE(~ E) = pA(~ A), where ~ i, i = A;E is dened analogously to the closed economy case
and, hence, it is proportional to the marginal productivity level, according to (5).10 As noted in
previous contributions on the matter, in the open economy it is necessary to distinguish between
the average productivity of domestic rms, ~ i, and the average productivity in the market, ~ it,
with the latter accounting for domestic production as well as the imports of foreign producers.
This average market productivity is dened in a way to ensure that P = M
(1 )=(1 )
t pi(~ it)
holds, with Mt  MA + ME denoting the total mass of intermediate goods available at the
market. As extensively discussed in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), the two averages ~ it and ~ i
are identical only if the negative lost-in-transit eect (caused by goods melting away en route
when international transactions are subject to iceberg transport costs) and the positive export-
selection eect (caused by selection of only the rms with relatively high productivity levels
into exports status) are of the same size. Since we abstract from any trade impediments and all
rms export in this paper, ~ it = ~ i must hold.
With the characterization of the average rm at hand, we can now proceed to determine
the goods market equilibrium in the open economy. For this purpose, we can again employ
the cuto productivity condition (CPC), the average productivity condition (APC), and the
prot maximization condition (PMC) to solve for the equilibrium values of Mi, 
i, and ~ i.
While the CPC and APC conditions are the same as in the closed economy, the specication
of PMC has to be adjusted, because in the open economy the mass of domestically produced
intermediates is smaller than the total mass of available intermediates. By virtue of (14), we
have Mt = [1 + (wi=wj)k]Mi, i 6= j and, hence, the country-specic PMC in the open world





















Figure 3 depicts the three conditions and the equilibrium values of Mi, 
i, and ~ i. To
facilitate the comparison of the closed and the open economy cases, we also display the autarky
equilibrium. From inspection of the gure it is immediate that a movement from autarky to free
trade reduces the marginal and average productivity levels, while it increases the mass of active
intermediate goods producers with headquarters in country i. This is in sharp contrast to the
Melitz framework and, hence, calls for further discussion.




A) also implies that variable production costs of the two
marginal rms are equalized in the open economy. This, however, is not true for the closed economy and, hence,
the ratio of cuto productivity levels does not equal the ratio of minimum wages under autarky; see eqs. (8) and
(14).
13In Melitz' original framework, the most productive rms start exporting in the open economy
and production expands at the intensive margin ceteris paribus. This raises nominal wages and,
hence, forces the least productive non-exporters to exit. As a consequence, the mass of domestic
producers shrinks and marginal productivity increases if a country opens up to trade. In our
model, labor supply is perfectly elastic at the mandated real minimum wage and, hence, the
nominal wage rate is uncoupled from changes in labor demand. An increased mass of available
intermediate varieties M in the open economy leads to a fall in the price index (if  < 1) and, due
to a constant real minimum wage, provokes a decline in the nominal wage rate. This allows less
productive rms to enter in the open economy and induces a decline in the cuto productivity






























Figure 3: Equilibrium in the open economy
Using the three conditions CPC, APC, and PMCi, we can explicitly solve for the equilibrium




















11In the borderline case of  = 1, the higher mass of active rms in the open economy does not aect the price
index so that the nominal wage rate stays constant. As a consequence, the mass of local producers does not









































Furthermore, noting that revenues of the average rms in A and E do not dier and that these
revenues are the same in the open and the closed economy cases, output of nal goods can easily




















which is larger than the respective output level in autarky (see (11)), provided that k(1   ) <
   1. Since output increases in both economies, it is immediate that world-wide nal goods
production must also be higher in the open than in the closed world economy.
With these insights at hand, we can now pursue the analysis in the closed economy step
by step to determine aggregate labor income, Wi = (1   ui)Lwi, and the unemployment rate,
ui. In particular, we can make use of the insight that constant markup pricing gives rise to
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Since revenues of the average rm do not change when a country moves from autarky to trade,
it follows from Figure 3 that aggregate labor income rises due to the increase in the mass of
local producers Mi. Furthermore, with the minimum wage being binding in the closed as well as
the open economy, the increase in aggregate labor income must be accompanied by a fall in the
unemployment rate. These positive labor market implications are well in line with the nding
for the competitive labor market model in Melitz (2003), where a movement from autarky to
trade raises the demand for labor and thus leads to higher real wages.
15One further remark is in order here. While the focus of our analysis is on the labor market
eects of trade liberalization, it is nonetheless possible (and probably interesting) to derive the
respective welfare implications. Since there is only one nal good in our model, total income Ii
can be used as a suitable utilitarian welfare measure for country i = A;E. Ii is given by the
sum of aggregate labor income, Wi = [(   1)=]Miri(~ i), and aggregate prots of domestic
rms at unitary xed costs, i  Mi[ri(~ )= 1]. With ri(~ ) being constant according to (6), it
follows directly that total income Ii is proportional to Mi and thus higher in the open than the
closed economy. Hence, there are gains from trade in our setting. While the existence of welfare
gains in a heterogeneous rms model is not new, it is notable that the source of these gains
diers conceptually from those in Melitz (2003) where the increase in productivity levels is a key
source of gains from trade. In our model, both the marginal and the average productivity level
need to decline, if a country opens up to trade. However, aggregate employment expands due
to entry of less productive rms, thereby reducing the negative consequences of labor market
imperfection.12
4 Minimum wages in the open economy
In the previous section, we have characterized the equilibrium in the open economy for two
countries that dier in their minimum wages. Furthermore, we have seen that, irrespective of
the level of minimum wages, both countries benet from the opening up to trade. However,
the analysis so far has not provided any insights on how variations in one country's minimum
wage aect the other economy. These cross-country linkages are at the heart of interest in the
subsequent comparative-static analysis.
Starting point is an equilibrium in the open economy as characterized in Section 3. Now
hypothesize that Europe raises its minimum wage from w0
E to w1
E. Similar to the closed economy
case, this shifts the European PMC locus outwards in Figure 3 and thus induces exit of local
producers, i.e., ME declines. The intuition behind this eect is that an increase in the minimum
wage reduces revenues of European rms, thereby rendering it unattractive for the marginal
producer in the benchmark equilibrium to stay active. At the same time, 
E and ~ E increase
{ as they are linked to ME through CPC and APC. While these eects are well understood
from the closed economy case, there is a crucial dierence between the two scenarios. A fall in
12Clearly, aside from the productivity and the employment eects, there are also welfare gains due to the access
to foreign intermediates and hence a stronger division of labor in the open economy. As it is well established
in new trade theory, such welfare gains depend crucially on the existence of external scale eects (see Ethier,
1982; Markusen, 1989). However, external scale eects are also elementary for welfare gains through positive
employment eects, which can only materialize if the mass of local rms increases (see the above discussion).
16ME reduces the overall mass of available intermediate varieties Mt in the open economy, with
negative consequences for the US if external scale eects are in play, i.e., if  < 1.
With external scale eects, a reduction in the mass of available intermediate varieties in
Europe lowers demand for varieties produced in the US. Hence, the higher minimum wage in
Europe triggers exit of the least productive rms and thus leads to a higher marginal and average
productivity level in the US, see (15). Graphically, the increase in wE shifts the PMCA locus
outwards with positive eects on 
A and ~ A and a negative impact on MA. The latter is an
immediate implication of rm heterogeneity, which dampens rm exit in Europe as well as rm
entry in the US. Due to this, the negative eciency eect of a higher European minimum wage
dominates the positive relocation eect, implying that the mass of US producers declines on
net. Furthermore, since both the employment rate 1   ui and aggregate wage income Wi are
proportional to the mass of local producers, it is immediate that a higher minimum wage in
Europe harms US workers. Put dierently, Europe can export part of the costs of a higher
minimum wage to the US labor market in the open world economy. This diers from the
respective conclusion of the analysis in Davis (1998) but motivates a positive correlation between
the unemployment rates in Europe and the US as in Figure 1.
5 Labor market linkages under oshoring of intermediate goods
production
In the previous analysis, intermediate goods were tradable but it was not possible for rm owners
in one country to oshore their production to the other economy if it was cheaper to do so. In
this section, we relax this assumption and study the incentives of rms in the more constrained
labor market (referred to as Europe, E) to oshore their production of intermediate goods within
a multinational organization to the relatively less constrained labor market (referred to as the
US, A) without changing the country headquarters are located in. Hence, prots accrue to the
same country with oshoring as with integrated home production. The concept and incentive
of oshoring in this model is similar to the one of unbundling of production in models with
vertical multinational enterprises (see Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 2002), except that rms are
heterogeneous here and oshoring requires producing with the rm-specic technology abroad.
Clearly, if there were no costs to oshoring, rms would always produce in the country with
lower wages. As a consequence, only one country's minimum wage could be binding and labor
market linkages would be the same as in a model with homogeneous rms. In this case, an
increase in the minimum wage of Europe would prop up US wages, similar to Davis (1998).
So, let us generally focus on the case where oshoring invokes an investment of f units of nal
17output in order to establish a production facility abroad. It is convenient (yet not crucial for
our results) to assume that f = 1 in order to keep notation simple. In this case, rms that shift
production have to pay twice the xed costs of exporters.
Let us consider a minimum wage dierential that is suciently small to ensure that not
all European rms engage in oshoring. Then, the marginal producers in the two countries are
exporters and revenues of the marginal rms do not dier from those in the pure exporter scenario
discussed in Sections 3 and 4. Hence, productivity levels of the marginal producers in the two
economies are linked to the minimum wage ratio according to (14), provided that the minimum
wage remains binding in both economies, which is assumed throughout the subsequent analysis.
Furthermore, the marginal oshoring rm in the high-minimum-wage country (indicated by
superscript o) is characterized by the indierence condition, rA(o
E)=   1 = rE(o
E)=, which,
accounting for rA() = (wE=wA) 1rE(), can be explicitly solved for rE(o
E). Combining the
resulting expression with the zero cuto prot condition for country E and denoting the share












Intuitively, the share of European oshoring rms rises with the minimum wage dierential
wE=wA. Furthermore, the formal condition for only part of European rms engaging in o-
shoring (i.e.,  < 1) is given by wE=wA < 21=( 1)   !.
In a next step, we have to determine whether the productivity of the average domestic rm
is still equal to the average market productivity with oshoring as in the pure exporter scenario.
Dening average market productivity ~ it in a way to ensure P = M
(1 )=(1 )
t pi(~ it), it follows
from the respective discussion in Section 3 that ~ it > ~ i. The reason is that with wE > wA only
the most productive European rms invest and oshore their production to the US. Hence, there
is a positive selection eect, which implies that the average productivity in the market is larger
than the average productivity of domestic producers. As formally shown in the Appendix, the









From eqs. (22) and (23), it follows that wE = wA implies  = 0 and thus, in line with the pure
exporter scenario, ~ it = ~ i. In contrast, wE=wA 2 (0;  !) yields  2 (0;1) and therefore ~ it > ~ i,
which conrms our intuition above. Dierentiating the expression in brackets of (23), we can
further conclude that the ratio of the average market productivity and the average productivity
of domestic rms, ~ it=~ i, increases monotonically in the cross-country dierential of minimum
18wages, wE=wA. Indeed, an increase in the minimum wage dierential renders it more attractive
for European rms to bear the additional xed costs of oshoring to the US. Since oshoring
rms need to be more productive than average exporters (in either country) and since these
rms can produce at lower costs and thus expand their output after oshoring, the increase of
the minimum wage dierential raises the productivity dierential ~ it=~ i in the US as well as
Europe.
With the average market productivity deviating from the average productivity of domestic
producers, the modied zero cuto prot condition for the US under oshoring is dierent
from the respective condition in the pure exporter scenario. We denote the new condition by
PMC0
A which determines again a negative relationship between marginal productivity 
i and


























where i 6= j. Comparing eq. (150) with eqs. (7) and (15), we nd that the PMC locus
shifts southwest in response to an economy's opening up to trade, as in the pure exporter
scenario. However, with oshoring of production, the respective shift of PMC in Figure 3 is
more pronounced and hence the increase in the mass of rms Mi and the decline in productivity
levels 
i, ~ i is stronger than in the pure exporter scenario. The reason is that the gains from trade
are higher if European rms can make use of cheaper foreign labor costs through oshoring to
the US. This further stimulates demand for intermediate goods, implying that the open economy
is characterized by a larger mass of producers with oshoring than without it. This additional
demand stimulus does not rely on the existence of external scale eects. Hence, the PMC-locus
in the open economy with oshoring lies below the respective locus of the closed economy, even
if  = 1.
Similar to the pure exporter scenario, the surge in rm entry ceteris paribus leads to higher
aggregate labor income and to a lower unemployment rate in the two economies. With respect to
the US labor market, this eect is reinforced by oshoring of the most productive European rms,
so that both aggregate labor income WA and the employment rate 1   uA are unambiguously
higher in the open than in the closed economy. In Europe, the positive eect of higher rm entry
is counteracted by oshoring of European producers with negative implications for domestic
employment and aggregate labor income. In general, it is not clear which of the two eects
dominates. Hence, with minimum wages being higher in Europe than in the US, it is possible
that European workers are worse o in the open than in the closed economy. European workers
would benet from opening up the economy, if wE were suciently close to wA. Then, only a
small fraction of European producers would be willing to bear the additional investment cost
19of oshoring to the US. Conversely, if wE=wA !  !, then the share of European non-oshoring
rms would approach zero and, hence, all European workers would become unemployed.
As a nal element of our analysis, let us take a closer look at the labor market linkages in an
open economy with oshoring. For this purpose, we investigate how an increase in the European
minimum wage inuences the labor market outcome in the US. There are two counteracting
eects. On the one hand, US workers lose from an external scale eect, if  < 1. In general, a
higher European minimum wage reduces world output and demand, and thus leads to exit of
intermediate goods producers in both economies. On the other hand, US workers benet from a
larger share of European rms that shift production across the Atlantic. In the borderline case
of  = 1, only the second eect materializes and, similar to Davis (1998), a higher degree of labor
market imperfection in Europe exhibits a positive impact on the US labor market. If, however,
 < 1, this result needs not hold any longer. If the external scale eect is suciently strong,
a negative impact on US workers is possible. In broad terms, we can therefore conclude that
oshoring of production lowers the positive correlation between European and US unemployment
rates, but it does not (necessarily) destroy it.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a model of two large economies with heterogeneous intermediate goods
producers and imperfect labor markets, due to country-specic real minimum wages. Within
this setting, we show that the existence of minimum wages aects the channels through which
gains from trade materialize. In the formulation of Melitz and other authors who rely on the
assumption of an inelastic labor supply, both an increase in the mass of available varieties and an
increase in the marginal productivity, which improves the composition of rms, are the driving
forces behind the welfare gains from trade liberalization. In our model, trade reduces the price
index (relative to other prices), quite similar to a model with perfect labor markets. However,
with a constant real minimum wage, the price reduction leads to a fall in the nominal wage and
thus renders entry of rms with low productivity levels attractive. This worsens the composition
of rms and leads to a fall in the marginal productivity level, an eect which is at odds with
Melitz (2003). However, entry of the new rms raises demand for production workers which
contributes to a positive welfare eect due to an increase in aggregate employment at constant
real wages.
Under free trade, our model also provides interesting features which dier from the ones of
previous work on international labor market linkages in trade models: rst, it generates unem-
ployment in all countries despite any dierences in the level of minimum wages because, with
20rm heterogeneity, factor prices do not equalize (even if production is diversied and trade not
subject to any impediments) and, second, it motivates a positive correlation of unemployment
rates across borders in response to shocks in individual economies. With homogeneous pro-
ducers, a minimum wage constraint can only be binding in one country under free trade and
diversication of production (i.e., with factor price equalization). Then, a tightening of the labor
market constraint in one country will raise unemployment there but prop up wages abroad as
in Davis (1998). If rms dier in their productivity, minimum wage constraints may be binding
in either country so that positive unemployment is ubiquitous.
With rm heterogeneity, trade only equalizes the production costs of the marginal producers
but not of all rms in the international market. In this case, detrimental eects of a tightening of
labor market imperfections abroad on world demand will not be oset by a relocation of produc-
tion from the foreign to the home country, unlike in models with homogeneous producers. Since
the contraction of the more constrained economy is moderated by a rise in average productivity
of the surviving rms, while the expansion of the less constrained economy is dampened by the
entry of rms with lower productivity, the increase in a country's minimum wage exhibits a neg-
ative spillover eect on the other country's labor market, thereby inducing a parallel increase in
both countries' unemployment rates. This result is remarkable as it qualies the by now conven-
tional wisdom among policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic that Europe's reliance on high
minimum wages entails an export of jobs and, hence, benets US workers. Clearly, this eect is
important and the mechanism at work is also present in our model. However, it is more than
oset in equilibrium by two additional eects: the reduction in world demand as well as selection
of rms into the market according to their productivity. Altogether, our analysis suggests that
workers in the US should be concerned rather than happy about European unemployment.
Of course, the analysis in this paper is parsimonious in many regards. For instance, consider-
ing minimum wages as the main source of unemployment, while convenient from the perspective
of analytical tractability, is quite simplistic from an empirical perspective. Certainly, in reality
other labor market institutions than minimum wages may govern positive unemployment rates
and these institutions may dier across countries. Also, our focus on rms which do not face a
decision between producing for the local market only versus exporting disregards the fact that
only a sub-sample of a country's producers acts internationally. While the basic mechanisms at
work would unlikely be invalidated by considering more sophisticated reasons of labor market
imperfections or by allowing for an extensive margin of exporting (apart from rm entry as
such), such modications may generate additional interesting predictions for empirical work.
However, these extensions are beyond the scope of this paper and, hence, left open for future
research.
21Appendix
Derivation of eq. (23)






















































































































































































































22If we make use (16), (22),  = (m
E=




, we can reformulate






















which conrms the relationship between ~ it and ~ i in (23) for the US. Finally, to check whether
eq. (23) is a correct description of the relationship between the two averages in Europe, we can
account for (16) and substitute pE(~ E) = pA(~ A) in eq. (A2). Then, following the formal steps









which conrms that (23) is also valid for Europe.
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